Once educational attainment and other observable characteristics have been controlled for, studies show that the gender wage gap among adult full-time workers is about half the size it was in 1980. Using U.S. Census and Current Population Survey (CPS) data from 1959 through 1999, the authors investigate the extent to which the decline in this gap was associated with changes across cohorts in the relative rate of wage growth after labor market entry (slopes), versus changes in relative earnings levels at labor market entry (levels). They find that slope changes associated with post-schooling investments, including work experience, account for no more than one-third of the narrowing of the gender wage gap over the past 40 years. The majority of the narrowing can be attributed to factors present at the time that successive cohorts entered the labor market, such as a growing demand for women's unobserved skills or declining discrimination.
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0019-7939/00/6303 $05.00 nce educational attainment and other observable characteristics have been controlled for, studies show that the gender wage gap among adult full-time workers is about half the size it was in 1980 (see Blau and Kahn 2006) . One well known reason for this is that women today experience fewer career interruptions and are more geographically mobile, which has enabled them to preserve and enhance their earnings capacity (see Goldin 1989; O'Neill and Polachek 1993) . In this paper, we argue that changes across cohorts in the degree to which women invest in their own human capital after labor market entry should be reflected in the rate at which their earnings "fall behind" men's over the life cycle. In other words, the "post-schooling investments [PSI] hypothesis" implies that we should see a change across cohorts in the slopes of women's relative age-earnings profiles.
Our research draws on the above insight to study the decline in the U.S. gender wage gap since 1959. Our approach complements existing work on this topic in two main ways. First, existing panel-based studies of the evolving gap assess the contribution of PSIs by measuring them as exhaustively as possible, for example, by accumulating detailed work histories (see Blau and Kahn 2006) . However, one can never be sure that such measures are complete.
1 Our approach, 1 Sources of incompleteness include the highly multidimensional nature of work histories. In addition to total years of actual experience, other factors that are likely important include the type of work performed, interpersonal interactions at the workplace, the tenure distribution on previous jobs, the number of and timing of all interruptions, hours on previous jobs, and past industry and occupational mobility. Also, it is hard to know whether particular actions (such as geographic mobility) were intended to be career-enhancing or not, and it is hard to imagine convincing measures of changes across cohorts in the amount of "energy" women put into their jobs compared to the home (see Becker 1985) .
by contrast, provides an alternative estimate based on the assumption that the value of all previous PSIs is incorporated into current earnings potential at each point in time. At the aggregate level, observed changes in the relative slopes of age-earnings profiles reveal information about the contribution of PSIs to the narrowing of the gender wage gap.
The second contribution of our analysis is that, unlike studies based on existing panels, we follow many cohorts over time-combining Census data from 1960 through 2000 and Current Population Surveys (CPS) data from 1964 through 2004.
2 Following cohorts is important because temporal changes in the cross-sectional returns to experience can sometimes present a misleading picture of what happens to a cohort of workers over the same interval of time. 3 In particular, what might appear in repeated cross-sections to be an increasingly strong relationship between age and women's earnings might be caused purely by a difference across generations in women's entry-level relative wages. 4 In sum, we draw a distinction between components of the gender wage gap that are present when women first enter the labor market (that is, factors affecting earnings "levels") and those that are reflected in women's relative rate of wage growth after labor market entry ("slopes"). Under reasonable conditions, we argue that changes in slopes provide an upper-bound estimate of the contribution of changing post-schooling investments to the narrowing of the gender wage gap. We believe that this estimate provides a complementary and-to the best of our knowledge-new perspective on why the gender gap has declined over the past four decades.
The Implications of Post-Schooling Investments: A Simple Model
In this section we describe two extremecase models of the decline in the U.S. gender wage gap. The first, illustrated in Figure 1 , attributes the entire decline to a changing relative rate of age-related wage growth caused by gender differences in work experience and other post-schooling investments. 5 In this example, we assume that every cohort of women earns 80 percent of the male wage on labor market entry, and (for the sake of simplicity) that women's relative wages decline linearly throughout each cohort's lifetime, the latter phenomenon due to women's lower post-schooling investments. 6 Among more recent cohorts, however, higher rates of PSIs imply that women's relative wages fall more slowly with age than in earlier cohorts. Despite the fact that women's relative wage at labor market entry is constant across generations of women in this hypothetical example, Figure  1 illustrates that the average level of women's relative wages in any particular year (given by a weighted average of the vertical array of points in any particular year)rises over time; this entire increase is accounted for by the changing slopes. Consistent with O'Neill's (2004) interpretation of growing coefficients on potential experience in women's crosssection earnings regressions as evidence of a growing ratio of actual work experience (or PSIs) to potential experience, the gender gap in the estimated "returns" to potential experience estimated from a cross-section 2 The PSID, beginning in 1968, is the only panel that comes close to providing the same time coverage. But, to improve on our estimates we would need a panel that enables us to see complete histories for all earnings observations, including those in the 1960's. This means the panel would have to begin decades earlier.
3 See for example Welch (1973) , who showed that low apparent rates of return to schooling among blacks in cross sectional data were artifacts of cohort effects reflecting the low quality of schooling received by older cohorts of black workers. 4 See for example O'Neill (2003) for dramatic evidence of such a change in women's cross-sectional return to potential experience. 5 For convenience, the time frame for these examples was chosen to mirror our Census data, which follow eight ten-year birth cohorts ranging from 1897-1906 to 1967-1976 over the five census years, 1959 through 1999. Cohorts in Figure 1 and subsequent figures are labeled by the year in which the cohort's median age was 27; thus for example, our first and oldest cohort was born somewhere between 1897 and 1906 and was between the ages of 23 and 32 in 1929.
6 Linearity is not imposed in our empirical implementation. regression also declines across years. This is illustrated by the fact that the vertical array of points is closer together in 2000 than in it is in 1960.
Next, for purposes of comparison, Figure  2 depicts a contrasting model of the rise in women's relative wages. In this "pure cohort effects" (or pure pre-market investments) model, the relative slope of women's ageearnings profile remains constant across all cohorts; women's relative wages at labor market entry, however, are changing as new cohorts enter.
7 As in Figure 1 , this model also depicts women's wages as rising over time. Yet in this case, none of the increase is explained by changes in the returns to potential experience. More importantly, despite the fact that every cohort's age-earnings profile has the same slope, estimates from cross-section regressions will show that the gender gap in returns to potential experience declines across years (the points are closer together vertically in 2000 than they are in 1960). 8 We conclude that caution is required in drawing conclusions from time trends in the slope of cross-sectional age-wage profiles alone.
In the remainder of the paper we investigate how the actual patterns over the course of the past 40 years in the United States compare with each of the two scenarios described above-changing age-wage slopes or changing relative wages at labor market entry. We then estimate a decomposition describing the comparative contributions of each to the narrowing of the U.S. gender wage gap. Compared to existing studies-many of which attempt to account for the declining gap by measuring observable investments made by women in a series of cross-sections-this decomposition offers a complementar y perspective. This is because it is unlikely that any data set will ever measure all the possible PSI differentials among women; studies attempting to do so will therefore always be vulnerable to the critique that they have failed to measure some critical, unobservable aspect of women's investments (for example, the energy put into the job compared to the energy expended at home [see Becker 1985] ). By searching for the "footprint" of all PSIs that are made after leaving school in the overall rate of age-related wage growth, we generate an alternative estimate of the role of PSIs that is not vulnerable to this critique. Aside from providing an alternative measure, this estimate may help bracket the total contribution of PSIs because -at least under the reasonable conditions that we discuss below-it places an upper bound on the role of PSIs.
Results: Census Data
Our census samples comprise U.S.-born, full-time, full-year white workers aged 23-62 in the years 1959, 1969, 1979, 1989 and 1999. 9 Simple descriptive statistics for these samples are provided in Appendix 1; their main features are well known. 10 In our analysis, gender earnings differentials are estimated for four birth cohorts in any given year, corresponding to workers who attain the age ranges 23-32, 33-42, 43-52 and 53-62 in that year. Altogether, the analysis includes at least one year of data for each of eight tenyear cohorts with birth dates ranging from 1897 through 1906 for the oldest cohort to 1967 through 1976 for the youngest. In what follows, we refer to the oldest cohort as number 1, followed by cohorts 2 through 8 in turn. Though this is a simple and clean way to compare cohorts in Census data, the fact that it combines ages 23-32-a period during which men's earnings profiles are steep and the gender gap might be changing rapidly-is a potential concern. Sensitivity testing in the 7 Of course, an alternative to the "changing slopes" model is a pure "year effects" model. We discuss the performance of such a model, and the identification issues that arise in distinguishing year effects, cohort effects and (changing) age effects later in the paper. 8 Mathematically, this results from the assumption in Figure 2 that the rate of decline in the gender wage gap is decelerating across cohorts. This would be the case, for example, if women's cohort-specific relative wage at labor market entry asymptotically approaches one from below, which strikes us as a plausible scenario. 9 We gratefully acknowledge Ruggles, et. al. (2004) . 10 The difference in the 1999 mean gender gap between the U.S. Census and CPS data disappears when data from surrounding CPS years (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) are aggregated.
following section, based on smaller age and cohort groupings in annual CPS data, demonstrate that the level of aggregation does not significantly affect our results.
Coefficients from cross-sectional earnings regressions using the Census data are reported in Table 1 . Since the sample is restricted to full-time, full-year workers and detailed hours controls are included, the dependent variable should be interpreted as an hourly rate of pay. In addition to these hours controls, the Table 1 regressions include standard (and comparable) controls for education and region, plus a quadratic in age (to capture the life-cycle pattern of men's wages).
11 Thus, all of the gender wage gaps that are reported in Table 1 (and whose evolution is studied in the remainder of this paper) are conditional on education:
What we are attempting to understand is why the gender wage gap narrowed even after accounting for the dramatic increase in women's education levels, especially at the college and higher levels, over the past 40 years. Finally, to allow women's wages to evolve differently than men's over the life cycle in as flexible a manner as possible, we include four gender-age interaction terms in each Census year. By construction, the gender coefficients along each diagonal of Table 1 thus describe the gender gaps that a given cohort of women faced at different ages.
Several patterns in Table 1 are immediately evident. First, gender coefficients tend to be larger among older cohorts than among younger cohorts observed in the same year (vertical); second, they fall if a given age group is followed over time (horizontal); third, they are surprisingly constant when a given cohort is followed over time (diagonal). These gender coefficients are also depicted graphically in Figures 3 and 4, with observations from the same cohort 12 On closer inspection of the within-cohort trends, we also see that gender wage gaps widen for every cohort as its median age rises from 27 to 37, and fall for every cohort between the (median) ages of 47 and 57, reflecting a consistently nonmonotonic pattern. Another, perhaps unexpected, feature of the within-cohort patterns is the share of a cohort's lifetime gender wage gap that is already present at the youngest ages in that table. For example, women aged 23-32 in 1959 faced a gender wage gap (holding education constant) equal to .432 log points. This corresponds to 74% of the maximum gender wage gap ever experienced by that cohort over its remaining lifetime (.587, at ages 43-52). Comparable figures for later cohorts are 83% for the cohort "entering" in 1969 and 94% for those entering in 1979.
13 Finally, between the ages of 37 and 47, we see a widening of the gender wage gaps for the two oldest cohorts observed in those age ranges, but a narrowing for the two youngest. This more subtle pattern suggests an increase across cohorts in the overall slope of women's relative agewage profile. Therefore, this first glance at the data reveals patterns consistent with the PSI hypothesis in the sense that the slopes changed over time, as depicted in Figure 1 , but the between-cohort shifts in levels appear to be even more pronounced.
To quantify the relative contribution of age-cohort interactions in explaining the recent decline in the gender wage gap, we now use the 20 age-and year-specific gender wage gaps estimated in Table 1 (and depicted in Figure 3 ) as data points in some simple aggregate regressions.
14 In particular, we estimate the following empirical model of women's relative wages:
(1)
In this model, RW j describes women's relative wages in each of the 20 age x cohort cells. The baseline effects of age on relative earnings are captured by
where A j (a) is an indicator for j belonging to age group a. Pure cohort effects on women's relative earnings are captured by the term
where cohort 1 (the oldest-born between 1897 and 1906) is the reference category, and C j (c) is an indicator for j belonging to cohort c. Finally, for each of cohorts 5 through 7, the interaction term (modeled as the product of age and the cohort indicator) allows the effect of age on women's relative earnings to differ from its effect in cohorts 1 through 4.
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In the regressions, age j is scaled to measure potential experience in decades elapsed since the first observation of the cohort, so age j ∈ {0,1,2,3}. If each successive cohort of women after cohort 4 had a steeper age-relative wage profile, as predicted by the PSI model, we would observe that 0 < q 5 < q 6 < q 7 .
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OLS estimates of equation (1) using the 20 estimated values of RW j in Table 1 as data are presented in column 1 of Table 2 . Overall, these results provide support for both the changing levels and changing slopes models. As predicted by the changing levels model, cohorts of women born later earn significantly more, relative to men, than cohorts born earlier, even at labor market entry. And, as predicted by the PSI model, younger cohorts of women exhibit a higher rate of age-related relative wage growth than older cohorts. Together, the "composite" model in column 1 fits our data on gender wage gaps almost perfectly, with an adjusted R 2 of .96. But how can we assess the quantitative contribution of changes in the slope of age-earnings profiles across cohorts to the recent narrowing of the gender wage gap?
One way to pose this question is to ask how well we can explain recent trends without recourse to steepening age-wage profiles at all. To that end, column 2 of Table 2 restricts all the cohort-experience interaction terms of column 1 to equal zero (0 = q 5 = q 6 = q 7 ). According to this model, there has been a large and statistically significant increase in women's relative wages upon labor market entry across cohorts. As might be expected, the growth in estimated cohort effects is somewhat larger in this model than in column 1. Somewhat less expected, though, is the fact that relatively little explanatory power is lost by dropping the interaction terms from the model: adjusted R 2 only falls to .91 from .96. Thus, a parsimonious model that fits the past four decades of data on the U.S. gender wage gap surprisingly well has each successive cohort of women entering the labor market at a higher wage relative to men, with each [1897] [1898] [1899] [1900] [1901] [1902] [1903] [1904] [1905] [1906] . Potential experience is measured as decades elapsed since the cohort was aged 23-32. Cohort-specific earnings growth rates are estimated relative to women born before 1937, and cannot be estimated for Cohort 8 since we have only one year of data for this cohort.
cohort having the same rate of wage growth, relative to men, as every other cohort.
For comparison, column 3 of Table 2 estimates a "pure changing slopes model" (as depicted in Figure 1 ) where women's relative entry wages are constrained to be the same across all cohorts (and years) but their relative rate of age-related wage growth can differ across cohorts. Compared to the composite model of column 1, the cohort-experience interactions are now much stronger, as the model attempts to fit the declining gender gap across cohorts using slope terms only. Clearly, however, with an adjusted R 2 of .72 this model does a considerably worse job of fitting the data than either the composite or the pure cohort model. We conclude that if an analyst had to choose only one of these two polar case models to describe the evolution of the gender wage gap over the last 40 years, he or she should choose the changing levels model over the changing slopes model.
Another way to quantify the effects of steepening relative age-wage profiles on the narrowing of the gender wage gap uses the coefficients estimated in the "composite" model of column 1, Table 2 to predict what the 1999 gender wage gap might have been in the absence of these effects. By comparing the actual change in the gender wage gap with the change that would have occurred under the counterfactual assumption of no changes in slopes, we can estimate the relative importance of changing slopes to the narrowing of the gender wage gap.
The regressions presented in Table 3 describe the actual gender gap in 1959 and 1999, followed by a counterfactual 1999 gap. The first two columns of Table 3 are similar to the regressions of Table 1 , columns 1 and 5, except that only a single gender coefficient is estimated for women of all ages in 1959 (column 1) and 1999 (column 2). The estimated log wage differentials are -0.540 in 
Results: CPS Data
To assess the robustness of our results to the data source, in this section we replicate the main aspects of our analysis using March CPS data. 19 The main advantage of these data over the Census is that they allow us to estimate an annual series of gender wage gaps, disaggregated by exact year of age rather than aggregated age group. The key disadvantages are that the CPS data include far fewer observations per year, and that the initial earnings observation is for 1962 rather than 1959. To overcome the absence of early observations, we simply used the 1960 Census data as a proxy for 1960-1963 CPS observations, so that we can compare CPS with Census results over the same 1960-2000 observation window. 20 CPS estimates are based on 41 years and 40 ages (23-62), broken down into 10-year, 5-year, or 1-year cohorts and age groups. Rather than run dozens of cross-section regressions with between 4 and 40 gender*age coefficients apiece, we use the other common two-stage procedure to compute the gender gaps. In the first stage, male-only regressions are run for each year, with controls identical to those used in the Table 1 regressions. Gender gaps for each individual woman are computed as the difference between her actual earnings and the earnings predicted if she were paid as much as a man with the same observable characteristics. The data points used in the second stage regressions are mean estimated log wage differentials for each age group*cohort cell, estimated from male-only regressions.
21 Table 4 reports the results of the secondstage regressions. In column 1, the census data are subjected to this procedure, with the same 10-year age and cohort groups as before. In column 2, the CPS data from the five census years are used, with very similar results. Column 3 presents results that are also based on 10-year age and cohort groups but which also include data from between-census years.
22 For a visual comparison to the census estimates, Figures 5 and 6 display the results of the Column 3 specification. Column 4 details the parallel analysis using 5-year cohorts and age groups. Column 5 is similar to columns 1 and 2, but with 1-year cohort and age groups, for a total of 1640 1-year cohort*age cells. This final specification includes 40 age levels and 80 cohort-specific fixed effects. The Table 4 estimates confirm that the census results are not sensitive to the particulars of the Table  1 specification.
All specifications produce comparable estimates of the pe*cohort interactions and 18 The contribution of changing age distributions was estimated to be negligible. When the 1959 women were reweighted to match the 1999 age distribution, the estimated gender coefficient fell by only 0.002 . When pe*cohort interactions were estimated from a single stage regression (gender interacted with age, cohort, and the pe*cohort interactions; year interacted with education, region, and hours per week), the estimated contribution of changing slopes fell from 0.32 to 0.29. 19 As with the U.S. Census, we observed annual earnings for the year preceding the survey date. These data were collected in 1964-2004, so we have earnings observations for 1963-2003. 20 Our assumption was that the wage structure remained stable during these early years, that is, that the gender gap for a 39-year-old in 1960 was a good proxy for a 39-year-old in 1962. In sensitivity testing, the later CPS observations (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) are also included. 21 To maintain comparable units between specifications, we estimate potential experience*cohort interactions using the mean of (age/10) in the cell, minus the mean of (age/10) at the first observation of the cohort. In specifications where cohorts do not always fit neatly into a single age group, the age group indicator is replaced with a vector indicating the proportion of the cell in that age group. 22 In column 3, the age-group controls indicate the proportion of the cell in the age group. .39 Notes. Columns 1 and 2 regressions use data from the 5 Census years; columns 3 -5 include annual data spanning the same four decades. In columns 1 -4 the youngest age group is the omitted category. Potential experience is measured in decades. Cohort-specific earnings growth rates are estimated relative to women born before 1937. The last row is computed relative to actual mean LWD from male coefficients: -.277 in 1999 and -.539 in 1959. *Statistically significant at the .05 level; **at the .01 level.
find U-shaped age-relative earnings profiles with upswing after age 47. 23 To help assess the magnitudes of the experience effects estimated from each of the five specifications, the analog of the Table 3 , column 3 counterfactual log wage differential is included at the bottom of each column. 24 In every case, the CPS estimates of the importance of changing slopes to the overall change in the gender wage gap are very close to the corresponding Census estimate (based on male coefficients). These estimates do not change much as the within-cell age-range shrinks, indicating that the larger groupings do not obscure important changes in slope. All estimates, both U.S. Census and CPS, attribute 30 to 40 percent of the change in the log wage differential to changing slopes.
Additional sensitivity testing finds that these results are robust to variations in specification. For example, the estimated importance of potential experience*cohort effects is virtually unchanged if we use an estimate of age minus education (rather than simply age) as our measure of potential experience. 25 Similarly, there is very little change if the oldest workers are eliminated from the sample.
26 If the analysis is restricted to college graduates only, changes in slopes play a somewhat larger role when the Census data are used, but a somewhat smaller role when the CPS data are used. Although we expected work experience to play a much greater role in the closing of the college graduate gender gap, our data do not provide clear support for this hypothesis.
Only one experiment led to a substantial change in the results. When the window of observation was shifted by two or four years (1962-2002, or 1964-2004) , the estimated potential experience*cohort effects fell substantially, implying an even smaller role for rising post-schooling investments. 27 For example, when the Table 4 , column 5 specification was run with the window shifted by two years, the estimated importance of changing slopes fell from 39 percent of the closing to only 24 percent of the closing. When the window was shifted by four years, it fell even further, to only 12 percent. This sensitivity to the time frame chosen suggests that a more complete model should incorporate a time trend-a possibility we explore in the following section.
Interpreting the Changes in Slope
In our discussion so far, we have made two assumptions that considerably simplify the interpretation of our empirical results. One of these is the (implicit) assumption that the population of women employed at any point in time (for whom we have wage data to analyze) represents all women who have ever participated in the labor force. How can we interpret our estimates if this is not true? To address this question, we note first thatsince our interest is in changes over time-the nonrandom selection of women into work will not affect our estimates of the importance of PSIs if the nature of selection is constant over time. But what if the nature of women's selection into work has become increasingly positive (with respect to unobserved ability) over the past 40 years, as both Blau and Kahn (2006) and Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) have argued? Of course, if changing selection into work has been purely a cohort-specific phenomenon, its effects would be absorbed by our cohort coefficients; in this case, our estimates of cohort-age interactions, and thus the importance of PSIs, would remain unbiased. In other words , changing selection of women into work will affect our estimates of the contribution of changing PSIs to the declining gender wage gap only to the extent that patterns of within-cohort selection into work over the life cycle also changed between cohorts. For example, if the within-cohort trend toward positive selection into work was stronger within earlier cohorts of women than it has been within more recent ones, our estimates will understate the contribution of PSIs to the decline in the gender gap. Though this is certainly possible, it seems more likely to us that the opposite is true; if this is the case then the recent time trend towards positive selection into work includes both a between-and a within-cohort component, and the changes in slope that we estimate here include some positive within-cohort selection effects and thus overstate the true 25 Since Census questions do not always allow us to estimate total years of education received, and since men and women had similar education levels throughout our sample period, we simply used age-22 as our potential experience measure. When this is changed to age-education-6, estimated pe*cohort effects were virtually unchanged, but slightly smaller. 26 Estimated pe*cohort effects were similar when the age range of the sample was 23-52 rather than 23-62. 27 The two-or four-year shift included not only the start and end dates of the sample, but also the birthdates of cohorts used to calculate the pe*cohort interactions. Table 4 
Notes: Fitted lines are estimated in
28
A second key assumption in our analysis so far is the absence of any pure year effects in our models of the gender wage gap. Essentially, since age, cohort, and year effects are not separately identified, 29 we have allocated all observed changes in the gender gap to two types of effects (and their interactions): cohort effects, which reflect changing premarket investments and cultural differences across generations; and age effects (and the changes therein across cohorts), which reflect changing post-schooling investments. Pure year effects on women's relative wageswhich could be generated, for example, by a decline in discrimination against women, or by increasing relative demand for female labor 30 -have so far been subsumed into the cohort, age, and cohort-age interaction effects estimated in Table 2 .
It is impossible to add a complete set of year effects to the regressions in Table 2 ; yet it is both possible and important to ask how a pure time trend in women's relative wages would affect our quantitative assessment of the contribution of cohort-age interactions to the decline in the gender wage gap. We address this question formally in Appendix 2; the results are as follows. First, if there is a true, positive linear time trend in women's relative wages, both the age effects (bs) and the cohort effects (gs) presented in all our tables so far will be overestimates, because any true year effects will be absorbed into these age and cohort coefficients. That said, our estimates of cohort-year interactions (the qs) will remain unbiased. More importantly, it follows that the share of the year-to-year decline in the gender gap attributed by our model to cohort-experience interactions (versus cohort and year effects together) is invariant to the magnitude of any linear time trend affecting women's wages.
Unfortunately, as Appendix 2 goes on to show, the above reasoning does not extend to nonlinear time trends; in such cases, our estimates of the relative importance of cohortyear interactions (versus all other factors together) will be biased. In particular, when the time trend accelerates, our estimated changes in earnings slopes will overstate the true trend in cohort-year interactions; when the time trend decelerates, changes in slope understate the trend in cohort-year interactions. Given this information, we perform a set of simulations in order to investigate upper and lower bounds on the true contribution of PSIs to the declining gender gap.
To do this, we first argue that our best empirical evidence about time trends, net of PSI effects, comes from observation of gender gaps among very young workers. These are depicted graphically in Figure 7 , using both Census and CPS data for ages 23-27. These series are flat between 1960 and 1970, then increase at a constant rate until 1990 (Census data) or 1995 (CPS data) before flattening out again. If any part of this nonlinear trend reflects year rather than cohort effects, then the changes in earnings slopes we estimate in Tables 2 and 4 incorporate both PSI effects and these year effects. In the simulations that follow, we vary the proportion of the trend attributed to year effects versus cohort effects.
All of the simulations are variants of the following experiment. Assume that a fraction a of the time trend in Figure 7 is caused by year effects, while the remainder is due to cohort effects. Use this assumption to create a trend-adjusted version of the relative wage variable, taking out both the assumed yearspecific and cohort-specific trends.
31 Then estimate the pe*cohort interactions from the 28 One exception we can think of is that welfare reform during the 1990s may have pushed an additional group of less-able women into the labor market. This might account for the deceleration in year effects during that decade, discussed later in the paper. Additional insights on changing patterns of selection into work could of course be gained from examination of long, nationally representative panel data sets. While certainly of interest, this is beyond the scope of the current paper. 29 Year, cohort and age effects are not separately identified because year equals cohort plus age (see Deaton and Paxson 1994 for an excellent exposition). 30 See for example Blau and Kahn (1997 and 2006) , who study the evolution of the gender wage gap in a framework where male and female labor are imperfect substitutes and are subject to changing relative demand over time. 31 The exact specification can be found in Appendix 3.
Note: Simulations are described, and α is defined, in Appendix 3. de-trended dependent variable. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 5 , with the fraction of the trend attributed to year effects (a) varying from zero to one. In column 1 of Table 5 , the entire time trend is attributed to cohort effects. 32 In columns 2 through 5, a gradually increasing proportion of the time trend is attributed to year effects. As expected (recall that year effects accelerated in the early part of our sample period), the estimated pe*cohort interaction falls for the 1937-1946 birth cohort as increasing importance is assigned to year effects. The effect is substantial. A significant drop is also apparent in the next entering cohort. For the youngest (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) cohort, which entered the labor market as the time trend began decelerating, the estimated pe*cohort interaction grows as year effects are introduced, but only slightly. Overall, as we simulate a larger demand shift towards female labor, the contribution of PSI effects (cohort-age interactions) to the narrowing of the gender wage gap tends to fall, but not dramatically (see Figure 8 , or the last row of Table 5 ). For example, if only one-quarter of the trend is attributed to year effects, the contribution of cohort-age interactions falls from .32 to .29 and the fit improves (see Figure 9) . 33 The Table 5 simulations reveal that estimates of PSI effects are not very sensitive to assumptions about the relative importance of cohort-specific versus year-specific trends.
We conclude our discussion of Table 5 by noting an important sense in which the 32 This differs slightly from the Table 4 , Column 1 specification because the cohort fixed effects are replaced by the more constrained functional form described in Appendix 3. Similarly, the Column 5 result differs only slightly from that obtained with unconstrained year fixed effects.
33 This is not an exhaustive set of simulations. For example, suppose relative demand grows more quickly for women at the entry level, while older women remain on previously established career tracks, at least for a while. Then a portion of the time trend will be captured by cohort effects, rather than by changes in slope, and the original PSI estimates will contain less bias than they do in the cases we simulate. If, on the other hand, there is declining demand for labor in the industries where older men tend to work (so relative demand grows more quickly for older than for younger women), then even our smaller simulation-based estimates of the importance of changing PSIs are too large. changing slopes and the changing levels models are complementary, rather than competing. Specifically, the introduction of even a small time trend induces the set of pe*cohort interaction terms to increase monotonically, as the changing slopes model predicts they should (Table 5) . Put another way, a model without any year effects suggests that there was a nonmonotonic pattern in the rates of post-schooling investment across successive cohorts of women, which to us seems unlikely. Finally, we note that in the presence of a positive time trend, the estimated contribution of women's rising post-schooling investments to the narrowing of the gender wage gap is unambiguously less than our "baseline" estimate, that is, less than one-third.
Conclusion
A widely cited explanation of the recent decline in the gender wage gap focuses on changes across cohorts in the rate at which women make post-schooling investments (PSIs) in their earnings capacity, such as accumulating work experience. In this paper we have assessed the contribution of changing PSIs to the recent decline in the gender wage gap by decomposing the decline into components associated with the slopes versus levels of women's relative wage profiles across eight cohorts of women observed over the past 40 years. Compared to existing studies, this decomposition offers a complementary (and to our knowledge unique) perspective: Rather than attempting to measure all PSIs meticulously at each point in time, we search for the "footprint" of all PSIs together in each cohort's overall rate of age-related wage growth over several decades of Census or CPS data. Aside from providing an alternative measure, this estimate may help bracket the total contribution of PSIs because-under fairly reasonable conditions-it places an upper bound on the role of PSIs.
Our analysis focuses on the gender gap that remains after controlling for differences in educational attainment and other factors. We find that (as predicted by a simple PSI-based model) the gender gap does tend to widen during the earliest years of the career, but then actually narrows substantially during 34 This U-shaped pattern suggests a model in which women's investments are delayed (perhaps until after childrearing), rather than reduced (see for example Polachek 1975; Weiss and Gronau 1981) . Of course, it is also consistent with a declining level of discrimination over the life cycle, relative to levels prevailing at the time of cohort entry (Blau and Kahn 2000) . 35 Interestingly, this one-third is similar to Blau and Kahn's (1997 and 2006) estimates of the contribution of rising actual experience to the decline in the gender gap. One interpretation of this result is that changing PSIs other than actual experience may not play a quantitatively significant role in the declining gender gap. much of the life cycle for all cohorts of U.S. workers in our data.
34 Second (and related), for every cohort in our data a surprising share of its lifetime maximum gender-wage gap is present very early in life. For example, women aged 23-32 in 1959 faced a gender wage gap (holding education constant) equal to 74% of the maximum gender wage gap ever experienced by that cohort over its remaining lifetime. Comparable figures for later cohorts are even higher. Third, we observed some cross-cohort increases in women's relative rate of age-related wage growth. These increases in slope can account for about one-third of the narrowing of the gender wage gap in a simple baseline model. When that model is expanded to allow for pure time trends in the relative demand for women's labor, or when changing patterns of selection into the labor market are taken into account, the likely contribution of rising post-school investments to the narrowing gender wage gap falls to less than one-third. 35 Thus, while our analysis provides some support for the popular PSI-based explanation of the decline in the U.S. gender wage gap, it also documents the existence of large, unexplained wage differences across cohorts that are already present at the start of women's working lives. Further, the reduction in these entry-level differentials accounts for the majority of the narrowing of the overall gender wage gap. What underlying factors, already present at labor market entry, might explain this larger portion of the change in the earnings of women relative to men with similar levels of educational attainment?
Obviously, one set of factors that might account for the large cohort effects in our data is unmeasured changes in pre-market investments. In other words, though our wage gap estimates hold years of education constant, trends in the type or quality of human capital women bring to the labor market (Polachek 1978; Brown and Corcoran 1997; Weinberger 1998 Weinberger , 1999 Weinberger , 2001 ) could account for the large cohort effects we estimate here. Using information on the college majors of a panel of college-educated workers of all ages from 1989 to 1999, Weinberger (2008) found that controlling for detailed college major does little to attenuate the large cohort effects. 36 Datcher Loury (1997) found similar results in younger panels. If no effect is found within panels of college graduates, it seems unlikely that trends in unobserved pre-market human capital investments can account for much of the "unexplained" decline 36 Another relevant finding of this paper is that the U-shape is even more pronounced, and swings upward earlier, when a fixed sample of college graduates is followed over time, compared to the corresponding synthetic cohort analysis.
in the gender wage gap in the population of women as a whole.
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A second possible explanation of the decline in the gender gap at labor market entry extends the human capital model of equation (1) by allowing cross-cohort differences in expected labor force attachment to affect women's entry-level earnings. Of course, in the standard general training model (see Blau et al. 1997, Chapter 6) , this makes it even harder to explain the cohort effects we estimate here: controlling for pre-market investments, the standard model predicts that early-career wages should actually be lower for persons who expect to be more committed to the labor market, while we observe rising entry-level wages over time. For inter-cohort differences in expected labor force attachment to explain the large cohort effects in our data, one would thus need early career investments to take a different form from what is usually assumed. For example, suppose that rather than taking time away from production, training investments take the form of increased hours or effort (beyond the level that would be optimal based on the worker's current productivity alone). In contrast to the standard model, these factors should raise earnings during the training period. That said, our main findings include controls for work hours; thus we are skeptical that a model based on changing hours or effort across cohorts of young women can explain the large cohort effects in our data. 38 Finally, of course, as we have already noted, there may have simply been a time trend in the relative price employers are willing to pay for female labor of a given level of education, training and expected future work attachment; a possible cause of such a trend is declining discrimination. As Appendix 2 illustrates, such a time trend would appear in our baseline model as upward bias in our cohort effects. Thus, declining discrimination could also account for the large and declining estimated cohort effects in our baseline model. In this regard, we also note that, in at least one key sense, introducing some pure year effects actually improves the performance of the "changing slopes" model in our data: When year effects are introduced, our estimated trend in agecohort interactions becomes monotonically positive-as predicted by the PSI model. In this sense, then, the PSI model and the hypothesis that discrimination against women has declined over the past 40 years may be complementary, rather than competing, as possible explanations of the recent decline in the U.S. gender wage gap. 38 An alternative modification to the basic model would be to make training firm-specific, or to add a mechanism to the model that would induce firms to pay for workers' general training (see Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, 1999) . For example, suppose, as in Kuhn (1993) , that returns to specific training are shared between workers and firms, and that entry-level wages are determined by a zero-expected-profit condition for firms given each demographic group's probability of remaining with the firm after training is complete. Now, because workers are paid some of their expected post-training productivity "up front," an increase in the expected labor force attachment of a cohort of women can, under reasonable conditions, raise the starting wages of that cohort.
Appendix Table 1 Sample 
Appendix 2 Introducing Year Effects
In order to examine the effects of introducing a time trend into our estimated model, we first formalize postschooling investments (PSIs) as a cumulative, non-linear, gender-and cohort-specific function of potential labor market experience. To that end, assume that the mean earnings of men after e years of potential experience are given by:
where Y 0 gives the entry wage and PSI M (a) gives the rate of post-schooling investment at age a. Similarly, assume that for women of cohort c:
where G c gives women's earnings disadvantage at labor market entry. Together, (A1) and (A2) imply that women's relative wages are given by:
Letting c = 0 be the reference cohort, it follows that
The first term, (1 -G 0 ), in equation (A4) corresponds to the intercept, a, in our estimating equation, (1). The second term, (G 0 -G c ), corresponds to the cohort effects (g c ) in (1); the third to the "baseline" age effects (b a ) on women's relative wages. Finally, the q c parameters in equation (1) approximate the average value (over all ages) of (PSI
(a)), which are the cohortage interactions at the heart of the pure PSI model. This allows us to test the argument underlying the PSI model, that is, that PSI F C (a) is higher, on average, for recent cohorts of women, relative to earlier cohorts at the same age.
We are now in a position to add a time trend, trend(t), to equation (A4), and to explore its impact on our estimates of PSI effects. To do this, we normalize units of measurement so that time (t) is measured in decades, and e + c = t. After adding the trend, equation A4 becomes: Critically, however, a linear trend will not affect our estimated PSI effects (pe*cohort interactions) at all. In sum, the presence of a true, positive linear time trend (obviously) affects the relative role of time versus cohort effects in explaining the narrowing of the gender wage gap (raising the importance of time and reducing that of cohort). It also biases our estimated age coefficients upward relative to their true values. That said, the presence of such a time trend leaves the total relative wage change attributable to pure time and cohort effects together unchanged, and leaves the contribution of cohort-year interactions relative to these two alternative mechanisms unchanged as well.
Finally, assume a more general case where the trend is not necessarily linear. The effect of any monotonically increasing trend is most clearly seen if we decompose the trend in the following way:
trend(e +c) = trend(c)+ trend(e)
+ [trend(e +c) -trend(c)-trend(e)]
where trend(c) represents the value of the trend at cohort c entry, and trend(e) represents the value of the trend when the baseline cohort reaches age e, relative to the value at t = 0. Then, Again, both cohort and baseline age effects are upward biased. But here, the estimated PSI effects (pe*cohort 39 To see this simply recall that acceleration means ƒ(x + ε) > ƒ(x) + ƒ(ε).
RW (e, c) = (1 -G
Appendix 3 Simulations
According to Appendix 2, our estimates of pe*cohort interactions in Tables 2 and 4 are biased upward when the time trend in women's relative wages accelerates and downward when the trend decelerates. Further, the data on entry-level wages in Figure 5 shows acceleration in the early years of our data and deceleration later. Unless this trend is purely cohort-specific, it follows that our pe*cohort interactions are biased upward for old cohorts, and downward for more recent cohorts.
The simulations presented in Table 5 estimate the size of this bias under a range of hypotheses about the nature of the true time trend. Based on the empirically observed time trend among entry-level workers (depicted in Figure 5 
= (G 0 -G c )+ trend(c).
Since it is impossible to identify the relative contributions of true cohort-specific effects (G 0 -G c ) and year-specific time trends (trend(c)) to T(t), we vary the relative importance of each in a series of simulations. In this specification, a describes the proportion of T(c) that is due to year effects, rather than cohort effects. Returning to relative wage equation (A5), the dependent variable for observations at all ages can be "de-trended" using the following transformation: If the correct value of a is known, regression of this de-trended dependent variable on age controls and pe*cohort interactions will yield unbiased estimates of age and PSI effects. Of course, we do not know the true value of a. The best we can do is to see how the PSI estimates (and age-earnings profiles) change as different values of a are simulated. Columns 1 through 5 of Table 5 report the results of simulations where a takes values 0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 1.
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